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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GROVER THOMPSON'
Plaintiff,

vs.
JOHN E. HARRIS Warden of the
Utah State Penitentiary,

Case No. 6655

Defendant.

CARL RoLLAND DEMMICK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN E. HARRis, Warden of the
Utah State Penitentiary,

Case No. 6656

Defendant.
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
IN BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS' PETITIONS
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

STATEMENT OF THE C.A!SE
The plaintiffs, Grover Thompson and Carl Rolland
Demmick, have each petitioned the abo;ve court for a writ
of habeas corpus, claiming they are illegally restrained
of their liberty by the defendant, John E. Harris, warden
of the Utah State Penitentiary. Attached to the petition
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of each plaintiff are the .certified copies of the information, verdict, and con.unitment, which read as follows:

(Title of Court and Cause):
INFORMATION
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTs, District Attorney of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, accuses GROVER THoMPSON of the Crime of RoBBERY
AND BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL, as follows, to-wit:
That the said Grover Thompson, on the 30th day of
October, A. D. 1941, at the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, robbed ·Corniela Johnson, after the following convictions:
That the said Grover Thompson on the 23rd day of
May, A. D. 1936, was convicted of the .crime of
Burglary ,in the First Degree, in the County of
Owyhee, Third Judicial District ,Court, State of
Idaho, and on the 23 rd day of May, A. D. 1936, was
sentenced to serve a term of not less than one or
more than fifteen years in· the Idaho Btate Prison,
and on said date was committed to ser-ve said term;
That the said Grover Thompson on the 14th day of
August, A. D. 1937, was convicted of the crime of
Robbery in Salt Lake County, Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, and on the 17th day of
August, A. D. 1937, was sentenced to serve a term
of not less than five years to life, and on ·the 27th
day of August, A. D. 1937, was committed to the
State Prison to serve said term;
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the .State of
Utah, in such cases made and provided, and against the
peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTs,
District Attorney of the Third
Judicial District in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
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(Title of

Cm~rrt

and Cau.se):
COM~fiTMENT

January 29, 1942
The above entitled case having been continued for
further hearing until this date, the defendant, the Jury
heretofore impaneled the respective counsel and all necessary persons hereto being present and ready the further trial of this case is resumed. Defendant '·s motion to
strike State's exhibits D and F having ;been submitted
and taken under advisement and the Court having considered and being now sufficiently advised in the premises
denies said n10tion. Corniela Johnson is recalled and
further examined. The state rests. Comes now defendant's attorney and moves the court to dismiss this action.
The motion is submitted ·without argument and denied.
The defendant is sworn and testifies in his own behalf.
Plaintiff's exhibits A, B, C, D, E, and F and defendant's
exhibits one and two previously offered are by the Court
recei;ved in evidence. Mrs. Charles 0 'Nash is sworn and
testifies in behalf of the defendant. J. Ros-s Hunsaker
is recalled and further examined. The defendant rests.
J. Ross Hunsaker is recalled and testifies in rebuttal.
State rests. Defendant rests. Both sides rest. Comes
now defendant's attorney asks and is given leave to reopen the case for the introduction of further te.stimony.
Lyle Keller is sworn and testifies in behalf of defendant.
On motion of Brigham E. Roberts, District Attorney the
Liquor Control Commission is ordered to produce certain records. S. M. Grua and E. A. Johnson are sworn
and testifiy in rebuttal. Edward Glen Cude and Corniela
Johnson are recalled and further testify. State rests.
Defendant rests. Both sides rest. Pursuant to oral
stipulation of respective attorney in open Court the jury
is instructed orally. The case is argued to the Court by
respective attorneys and submitted. The jury thereupon
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4
retires to consider of its verdict and subsequently returns into open Court and says by its foreman as follows,
to-wit:
"We, the Jurors, impaneled in the above case find
the defendant guilty of rotberry and being an habitual
criminal. ''
Dated: January 29, 1942.
Signed: N. HAMILTON, Forman.

I

The jury is thereupon polled each juror answering in
the affirmative the the above was and now is her or
his verdict. The jury is discharged from further consideration of this case and excused subject to call. Comes
now the defendant, waives time for passing sentence
and asks that sentence be passed at this time. The defendant is thereupon asked by the Court if he has any
legal ·cause to show why judgment and sentence should
not he pronounced upon him and the defendant having
answered that he has not, the Court now pronounces
the following judgment and sentence upon the defendant:
"The judgment and sentence of this Court is that
you, Grover Thompson, be confined and in1prisoned
in the State Prison for a term of not less than
fifteen years.''
And you, ·S. GRANT YouNG, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah, are hereby commanded to take the said GROVER
THoMPSON and deliver him without delay to the Warden
of the State Prison, 'or other person in charge thereof, ·
then and there to be confined and imprisoned in accordance with the above sentence and commitment.
CLARENCE E. BAKER, Judge.
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(Title of Court and Cause):
VERDICT
\V e, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find the
defendant guilty of roberry and being an habitual criminal as charged in the information.

Dated Jan. 29, 1942.
N. M. HAMILTON, Foreman.

(Title of Court and Cause):
INFORMATION
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTs, District Attorney of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, accuses CARL RoLLAND DEMMICK alias RoBERT
MAsoN alias RoBERT BRYSON of the Crime of Burglary in
the Second Degree, Grand Larceny, and Being an Habitual Criminal, and charges :
That the said Carl Rolland Dernmick alias Robert
.Mason alias Robert Bryson, on the 21st day of November, A. D. 1941, at the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, broke and entered the dwelling of Wayne
Christofferson, in the nighttime, with intent to commit larceny therein;
That the said Carl Rol.land Demmick alias Robert
:Mason alias Robert Bryson, on the 21st day of November, A. D. 1941, at the County of ·Salt Lake, State
of Utah, stole fron1 Wayne Christofferson, one
Philco Model 41608 Serial No. R-29350, and nine
(9) Victor Records, all of the value of more than
Fifty ($50.00) Dollars, the san1e being the property
of Wayne Christofferson;
That the said Carl Rolland Demmick alias Robert
Mason, on the 2nd day of September, 1930, was convicted of the crime of Depriving an Owner of the
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Possession of His Automobile, in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and on the 2nd
day of September, 1930, was sentenced to serve an
indeterminate term not exceeding five years in the
~state Prison of the State of Utah, and on the 5th
day of ~September, 1930, was committed to the State
Prison to serve said term;
That the said Oarl Rolland Demmick alias Robert
Bryson, on the 9th day of May, 1934, was convicted
of the crime of Burglary in the .Second Degree, in
the Superior Court of Sacramento County, State of
California, and on the lOth day of May, 1934, was
sentenced to serve a term of not less than one or
more fifteen years in the Folsom Prison of the State
of California, and on the lOth day of May, 1934, was
committed to the Folsom Prison of the .State ·Of
California to serve said term;
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the ·State of
Utah, in such cases made and provided, and against the
peace and dignity of the .State of Utah.

E. RoBERTs,
D·istrict Attorney of the Third
Judicial District in and for
SaU Lake Cownty, State of Utah.

BRIGHAM

(Title of Court and Cause):
VERDICT
W·e; the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find the
defendant Carl RoHand Demmick, guilty of the crime of
Burglary in the Second Degree, and Being An Habitual
Criminal as charged in the information.
Dated Nov. 23, 1942.
ALBERT BARTLETT,

Foreman.
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(Tille of Court and Cause):
VERDICT
\Y e, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find
the defendant Carl Rolland Demmick guilty of the crime
of Grand Larceny, and Being An Habitual Criminal as
charged in the information.
Dated Nov. 23, 1942.
ALBERT BARTLETT,

F orem.an.

(Title of Cou.rt and Cause):
COMMITMENT
November 28, 1942.
This being the time previously fixed for the passing
of sentence upon the within named defendant, said defendant being present in person and represented by Ray
S. McCarty, counsel, and Brigham E. Roberts, District
Attorney, appearing in behalf of the State of Utah. The
defendant herein having filed a motion for a new trial.
Guy K. Robinson is sworn and examined in behalf of
said motion and said motion is presented to the Court by
counsel for the defendant and is denied. Thereupon
the defendant is asked by the Oourt if he has any legal
cause to show why judgrnent and sentence should not
be pronounced upon him at this time. The defendant
responds thereto that he has none, whereupon the Court
pronounces the following judgment and sentence;
"It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that
you, Carl Rolland Demmick, be confined and imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than fifteen ( 15) years nor ·
more than life upon the charge of burglary in the
second degree and being a habitual criminal, and
you are also sentenced by this Court to serve an
indeterminate term of not less than fifteen (15) years
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nor more than life in the Utah State Prison upon the
charge of Grand Larceny and being an habitual
criminal, said sentences to run concurrently.
The Court orders the defendant granted a stay of
execution of sentence to January 4, 1943 upon certain
conditions imposed upon the defendant by the Court,
and he is placed in the custody of the State Adult Parole
and Probation Department.
The within named defendant having previously
been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this
date, upon recommendation of the State Adult Parole
and Probation Department and good cause appearing
therefore the Court orders the defendant committed
pursuant to the judgment and sentence previously entered herein.
And you, S. GRANT YOUNG, Sheriff of Salt Lake
County, Utah, are hereby commanded to take the said
Carl Rolland Demmick and deliver him without delay
to the Warden of the State Prison, or other person in
eharg~ thereof then and there to be confined and imprisoned in accordance with the above sentence and
commitment.
Dated: Jan. 4, 1943.
Issued : Jan. 5, 1943.
A. H. ELLETT, Judge.

(Title of Court and Cause):
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HAD IN CONNE-CTION WITH SENTE~NCING OF DEFENDANT,
CARL ROLLAND DEMMICK, ON
NOVEMBER 28, 1942.
PROCEEDINGS
THE CoURT: Judgment and sentence of the court
is that you he confined in the State Prison for the indeterminate period as provided by law of not less than
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9
fifteen years. However, I am going to give you a stay
in that matter and plare you with the Adult Board of
Probation and Parole.
l\lR. RoBERTS: There are two counts on this matter,
Your Honor. I mn wondering· if the record should show
the sentence on each. Of course, they can run concurrently.
THE CouRT: Each one, I take it, to be an habitual
criminal rharge.
MR. RoBERTS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE CouRT: The burglary and grand larceny are
each tied in with the habitual criminal.
MR. RoBERTS:
sufficient.

I guess the one sentence would be

'V

THE CouRT:
ell, I am not just certain on that .. I
had a little doubt at the time of instruction. I instructed
the jury they could find either or rboth. I conceive that
there are two separate offenses by virtue of the two
counts, and the sentence on each count will be not less
than fifteen years. They may run concurrently, and
I am going to give you a stay until January 4, 1943.
Now, where were you working, Mr. Demmick, when you
were arrested?
MR. DEMMICK: The first time I was arrested-that
is, on this-they brought this charge against me-was in
Tooele, Utah. I was driving a truck out there.
THE CouRT: Where were you working when you
came in to trial?
MR. DEMMICK: I was working for Mr. Melis and
Victor Newman. The day I came here I was supposed
to have taken his truck to Hill Field and put it to work
up there.
THE CouRT: I will ask Mr. McFadden to make arrangements to see if the same work can be had. If not,
I will ask him to make some arrangements for your work,
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and you will ~be left in jail until he calls for you. Are
you a drinking man?
MR. DEMMICK:
not a drinker.

Well, I drink a little, sir, but I am

THE CouRT: I believe in each of your offenses there
has been the matter of drink connected with it, some
drink, some evidence of drink. One of the conditions
of your staying out of the penitentiary is that you drink
no liquor or beer. That may be hard, but it will be no
harder than if you were in jail where you couldn't get it.
MR. DEMMICK: No sir.
THE CouRT: So you must not drink. If I hear of
your drinking at all, I will sign a commitment, and you
will sign the agreement with Mr. McFadden to report
and be under his direction.
MR. DEMMICK: Yes ~sir.
THE CouRT: That's all.
MR. DEMMICK: Your Honor, may I say somethingf
THE CouRT: Yes.
MR. DEMMICK : I think I can possi,bly clear this up
in the next two or three months, this whole charge, and
if it is possible for me to do it, would you exonerate mef
THE CouRT: If you can do anything, I would do
everything I could for you. I believe it lays in your
power to clear this up. That is the reason I am not
putting you in the pr~ison. I think you are implicated,
but I think you had some help that are outside and that
some of these boys that were doing some testifying are
possibly in it just as much or more than you are, and I
am satisfied it is in your power to clear this up. I will
tell you this. I would think a lot more of you if you
would come clean with the matter, because I think the
:first element of being a good citizen is to tell the truth.
MR. DEMMICK: ·That is right hut,· Your Honor I
know it is pretty difficult for you to believe, and a nian
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with IllY record that ean eome up here and on an ab.solute Ii1iscarriage of justice.
THE CouRT: Yon can talk to the District Attorney
about the thing. If you ran clear it up to the satisfaction of hin1, I am ·Satisfied he would be interested in aiding and assisting· you in getting a pardon on this Inatter. too.
MR. DEMMICK : Thank you, sn.

That the plaintiff, Grover Thompson, .alleged that
his restraint and imprisonment were illegal in this:
a. That it affirmatively appears from said information that the defendant had never been twice sentenced and committed to prison for terms of not less
than three years, as contemplated by Section 103-1-18,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.
b. That said information was insufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court for the reason that Section
103-1-18, Revised ,Statutes of Utah, 1933, had been repealed 1by implication by the indeterminate sentence
act of 1919.
c. That the verdict in the above case was improper
and illegal, in that said verdict was based on an information that did not confer jurisdiction on the court.
d. That the court had no jurisdiction to try the
status of an habitual criminal until the defendant had
been convicted on the third substantive offense, to-wit,
the robbery charge alleged to have been committed on
the 30th day of October, 1941, said conviction being a
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condition precedent to the deter.mination of the defendant's status as an habitual criminal.
e. ·That sentence and commitment are void becaus~
they exceed the jurisdiction of the court, and because
it cannot be determined from the record whether the
defendant was sentenced for the crime of robbery or
for the status of an habitual criminal, or both, and for
the further reason that the sentence is an indefinite
sentence.
That the .said Carl Rolland Demmick, in addition
to the foregoing reasons alleged, the sentence and commitinent in his case were void for the reason that he
was sentenced to fifteen years to life, and that the court
had no jurisdiction to sentence the defendant on the
first count for more than twenty years, and on the second count for more than fifteen years, and that the .said
sentence and judgment as appears from the transcript
of the proceedings prepared by the official court reporter,
·on November 28, · 1942, was illegal and void and beyond
the jurisdiction of the court for the reason that the court
had no power to sentence said defendant for being an
habitual criminal, there being no such crime as habitual
criminal, and for the further reason that said sentence
is void because it is an indefinite sentence; and that
said commitment made and entered January 4, 1943,
was illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the court for
the reason that the court had paroled thi~ defendant
on November 28, 1942, and then on January 4, 1943,
revoked said parole without hearing or without order
to show cause.
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That the defendant, John E. Harris, warden in
each case, made his return adn1itting that he had custody of the defendants, and in each case attached a
certified copy of the judgment and cmn1nitment, whieh
judgn1ent and commitinent were the same as heretofore
set out, and in addition thereto, the warden filed in each
case his motion to quash the writ of habeas corpus, which
were the same in each case, which claim that the pet,itioner in each case did not set forth facts sufficient to
justify the issuance of said writ and that each petition
showed that the detention of the plaintiff by the defendant is legal and lawful.
POINTS FOR DETERMIN,ATION
We will consider the points for determination as
the plaintiffs have listed them in their petitions.
PorNT I.
THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURI,SDIOTION TO PROCE,ED IN
EITHER OF S'AID CASES BECAUSE IT AFIFIRMATIVE·LY
APPEARS FROM THE INFORM·ATION IN EACH CASE THAT
THE DEFENDANTS HAD NEVER BEEN TWICE SENTENCED
AND COMM:ITTIDD TO PRISON FOR T'EiR.MS OF NOT LESS
THAN THREE YEARS, AS CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION
103-1-18, RENISEID STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933.

In considering this point, we will refer to the brief
in the case of State of Utah v. Walsh. Following up the
idea there suggested, we find that our habitual criminal
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statute was taken practically verbatim from an old
Massachusetts statute. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, (Mass. 1900) 175 Mag,s, 202, 55 N. E. 988. Prior to
the enactment of this act, in the case of Ex parte William Seymour, (Mass. 1833), 14 Pick 40:
"In the statutes of 1817 and 1827, which provide that whenever any person who shall be convicted of any crime, the punishement whereof
shall be confinement to hard labor 'for any term
of years' shall have been before sentenced to a
like punishment, he shall be sentenced to punishment in addition to that by law prescribed for
the offense of which he shall be convicted, the
words term of years mean a period of time not
less than two years.''
The court said on page 43 :
"We think the only mode of giving a reasonaible and sensible construction to the statute is,
to consider those words as introduced for the
purpose of describing the higher classes of offenses, distinguishing from among crir~:tes, all of
which are by law punishable by confinement to
hard labor, for longer or shorter periods, according to their aggravation, those of sufficient magnitude, to be punishable by a long period of confinement to hard labor. Considering this to be
the object and purposes for which this clause was
introduced into the statute, we think the natural
and legal, as well as the literal and grammatical
construction of the words, 'any term of years',
must ibe a period of time of· not less than two
years.''
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In the case of Co·rn.m-onwealth v. Ebenezer Evans,

16 Pick (:Mass. 1835) 448, on page 451, in discus,sing Ex
parte Seymour, supra, the court said:
"In that rase it was held that the language
of the statute was not to be understood in a
technical sense, but as indicating the degree of
aggravation, short of which a convict, after the
second or third conviction, should not be subjected to an additional punishment, and that any
tern1 short of two years would not be sufficient
for that purpose, although an estate for a half
a year, or less, would he a term for years in the
technical meaning of the words.''
It is obvious that the informations in both cases
were so fundamentally defective in substance so that in
no manner or form, and by no intendment or inference
could it state a status denounced by our habitual criminal law. Therefore, the informations were insufficient
to confer jurisdiction, and the parties in custody by
reason of commitments based thereon, should be discharged on habeas corpus. Ex parte Thornto.n (Okla.
1925), 234 P. 217.
The cases at bar come within the rule laid down
in Atwood v. Cox, 88 U. 424, 55 P. (2d) 377, at page 381,
where this court says :
"Where the pleading shows on its face that
the subject-matter in regard to which ju~isdic
tion is attempted to be invoked is one over which
the court has no jurisdiction, then the court has
no jurisdiction to go any further than to decide
to refuse to take cognizance.''
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In the instant case, of course, the jurisdictional
facts and essential ingredient missing is the fact that
they had not ~been each previously convicted, sentenced,
and committed to prison for terms of not less than
three years.
The following is taken from the note in 57 A. L. R.
at page 86:
''The rationale of this doctrine is that in
criminal cases the jurisdiction of the court extends to such matters as the law has declared
criminal, and none other; and when a court undertakes to punish for an offense to which no
criminality attaches, however reprehensible such
offense may he in the forum of conscience, the
court acts beyond its jurisdiction. An indictment,
information, or written accusation is the very
groundwork of the whole superstructure of a
prosecution for the commission of an offense. If
such an information contains allegations of overt
acts or conduct which does not constitute any
crime known to the law, or undertakes to state
an offense, hut the facts stated do not constitute
the offense, and no addition to them, however full
and -complete, can supply what is essential, the
court is ·without jurisdiction to put the accused
on trial. In such case the judgment of conviction cannot be corrected. It is ,simply void. Imprisonment thereunder is illegal, and the accused
is entitled to his release in a habeas corpus proceeding, even though he might secure the same
relief on appeal. ' '
That, we believe ·correctly states the rule. The above·
remarks by the annotator are followed iby several wellconsidered cases found in the same annotation. See
also 39 L. R. A. 450-455.
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Ex parte [(aster, (Dist. Ct. of Appeals,
California, 1921), 198 P. 1029;
Ex parte Robinson (Fla. 1917),
75 So. 604, L. R. 1\. 1918B 1148;
In re Evat1s, 42 U. 282, 130 P. 217;
Batley v. Ritchie, 73 U. 320, 273 P. 969;
Bruce v. East, Sheriff,
43 U. 327, 331, 134 P. 1175.
It might be argued that the court had jurisdiction
over the substantive offense, even if it did not have jurisdiction over the status; that the allegations charging
the substantive offense were mere surplusage. But, in
the cases at bar, the substantive offenses were so comingled with the status that it would be impossible to
segregate them. They are charged together in the same
information, tried at the same time at the trial, the verdicts found the1n guilty of both, and they were sentenced
and committed on both.

It is not like charging two

crimes in the same information under different counts.
There it would be a very easy matter to segregate, because the verdicts would be separate, as also would be
the sentence and commitment, but here they are so comingled that they cannot be separated without destroying the entire structure.
The plaintiffs contend that the entire charge and
proceedings were void, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to their discharge.
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PoiNT

II.

THAT SAID INFORMATION WAS INSUF'IFLOIENT TO CONFER
JURISDICTION ON THE COURT FOR THE "RIDASON THAT
SECTION 103-1-18, REVISED ·STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933, HAD
BEEN REIPEA,LEID BY IMPLICATION BY THE INDET·ERMINATE SENTENCE ACT OF 1919.

Section 103-1-18 provides specifically that in order
that a previous crime might he made part of the predicate
for a charge that a defendant was an habitual criminal,
such crime must have resulted in conviction and commitment for not less than three years. When Section 1031-18 was adopted, the legislature could only have contemplated, and in fact did contemplate, that every sentence should be set hy a judge, according to the degree
of heinousness of the crime proved. In making a decision as to sentence, the judge was limited to facts
presented at the trial.
With the passage of the indeterminate sentence act,
judge-made sentences were eliminated. The Pardon
Board was given the sole power to determine the length
of sentence, where previously the trial judge had done
so. It was held in ·several cases on matters distinguishable from those involved here that any sentence was for
the maximum period permissible under the law, suibject
to a ·condition subsequent, namely, the exercise of executive clemency in the light of a multitude of personal
and social factors which never were and never could
have been considered by a judge in fixing a definite
sentence ; as, for e~ample, facts occurring subsequent to

.j
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the trial. See the cases of IJ;J~dart v . Pratt, 51 U. 246, 170
P. 67; Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 U. 245, 284 P. 323, 76 A. L. R.
460; and State v. Roberts, 91 U. 117, 63 P. (2d) 584.
Can these two acts be reconciled in the light of all
the facts and circumstances ·r Clearly not. Obviously
it was not in1agined that practically every crime would
furnish a basis for the application of the habitual criminal statute. Such would, however, be the practical result if the maximum permissible sentence under the
indeterminate sentenee law were held to be the sentence
for the purpose of proving a defendant had acquired the
·Status of being an habitual criminal. The framers of
the indeterminate sentence act did not intend to create
a rigid and inflexible system under which any two previous crimes with a maximum permissible sentence in excess of three years should form the predicate for a charge
of being an habitual criminal at the instant of the third
conviction. The fact that such an intention was lacking
is proven by the fact that the legislature itself distinguished between (a) previous crimes requiring sentences
of not less than three years each to meet the terms of the
statute, and (b) a third crime, any felony, without regard to the liability for sentence, be it long or be it short.
Moreover, if the legislature had intended to provide that
the maximum should govern, it could readily have so
guished between (a) previous crimes requiring sentences
provided, but it did not. Neither did it intend that the
minimum sentence should govern, for the purpose of
the habitual criminal act, for it did not so pro;vide.
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Instead, the legis,Iature provided that, where the circumstances surrounding a crime were such as to lea~
a judge to fix a sentence of not less than three years, the
crime should be used in. applying the habitual criminal
statute. Since judge-made sentences have been abolished,
and the actual duration of sentences is determined by the
Board of Pardons, the only close approach to the original intent of the legislature today is by counting those
crimes where not less than three years have actually been
served.
Aside from the obvious fact that the legislature did
not provide for the ''time actually served'' tes.t, there
is a further and dominating reason why that test cannot be used to reconcile the two statutes. That reason
is that the indeterminate sentence act outlined a social
policy with respect to the duration of sentences which
was a complete substitute for the habitual criminal law
and the social policy it represented. The whole purpose
of the indeterminate sentence law was to provide a different standard of judgment with regard to sentence
than that of the opinion of the legislature or of the individual trial judge, and one which would be sufficiently
tailored to meet the need of society in each separate
instance. See the case of Cardiseo v·. Davis, 64 P. (2d)
216, cited on page 23 of the Walsh brief and quoted at
length. All sentences became indeterminate, by the
terms of the act. No sentence was definite within the
permissible minimum and maximum limits, but all became subject to the ·exercise of a .condition subsequent, the
exercise by the Pardon Board, in its sole discretion, of
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its judgent with regard to various stated and unstated
facts, objectives, and principles of the administration of
justice.
If the legislature intended to g·ive this broad diseretion respecting· the duration of sentence to the Board
of Pardons, it impliedly withdrew its own previous determination of the sentence in the type of case covered
by the habitual criminal law. Such an implication is
supported by the fact that the legis·lature gave such
broad discretion to the Board of Pardons as to render
inoperat-ive every legislativ·e determination of a ''minimu·m" sentence. The habitual criminal law is a minimum
sentence la-w and is accordingly impliedly repealed.
"\Vhen one realizes that penal statutes must be
strictly construed, one must accept the view that two
competing policies are expressed by these acts, the later
of which crystallizes a modern, flexible concept which
is inconsistent with the earlier, and which, being superior
to the earlier, must govern.
In this view, the district court had no jurisdiction
to entertain an allegation of habitual criminality, since
from the time of the passage of the indeterminate sentence act, the babi tua.l criminal act was repealed by clear
implication. Surely, if any act which is void by reason
of being unconstitutiona·l can be attacked on habeas corpus, an act which had been so clearly repealed by implication as Section 103-1-18 can be attacked in the same way.
See the case of Ex Parte Bailey, 64 P. (2d) 278, (Okla.,
Grim. Ct. of .&ppeals, 1936), where the court, in an habeas
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corpus proce-eding, held that a judgment of conviction
for the "·crime'' of being an habitual crinrinal was void
since there was no such offense known to the penal code.
POINT

III.

THAT THE VERDICTS IN THE ABOVE CASES WERE IMPROPER
AND ILLEGAL, IN THAT SAID VIDRDIOTS WERE BASED
ON

IN~ORM·ATIONS

THAT DID NOT CONFER JURI-SDIC-

TION ON THE LOWIDR COURTS.

The verdicts and commi.tments were improper, illegal, and beyond the jurisdiction of 'the lower oourts in
that they were based on informations which gave no
jurisdiction to the lower courts to determine whether or
not the defendants had acquired the status of being
habitual criminals. See arguments and citations under
Points I, II, and III.
V\1here a judgment, sentence, or order is fatally defective upon the face of the record, habeas corpus will
lie. 2.9 C. J. 8., p. 54, Sec. 46.
PoiNT

IV.

THAT THE COURT HAD NO JURI·SDICTION TO TRY THE STATUS
OF AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL UNTIL THE DEFENDANTS
HAD BEEN CONVICTED ON THE THREE SUBSTANTIVE
OFFENSES IN EACH CASE, SAID CONVICTIONS BEING
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

TO ANY DETERMINATION OF

DEFENDANTS' STATUS AS HABITUAL CRIMINALS.

The proposition that the court had no jurisdiction
to try the status of being an habitual criminal in either
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case until the defendant was convicted of his third
substantive offense seems too clear to require discussion.
The words of the act, ''upon conviction'', cannot possibly be construed to mean "before" or "during" or any
other thing but "after" conviction.

The third convic-

tion of any felony, follo,ving two previous convictions and
conm1itments for not less than three years, is an absolute
condition precedent to the determination of the defendant's status as an habitual ·criminal, even if the statute be by son1e Ineans reconciled ·with the indeterminate
sentence act, and is not a condition precedent that could
be waived in any manner, being fundamental to the
eause. See 29 C. J. 8., p. 44, Section 35, which reads as
follows: ''Disregard of mandatory requirements essential to jurisdi~tion to proceed with the trial will support habeas eorpus. ''
Therefore, even if the court could reconcile the
habitual criminal act with the indeterminate sentence
act, no court could be said to have had jurisdi·ction of the
status under the conditions which obtained in the trial
courts in these cases. It is obvious that the courts not
only pretended to have a jurisdiction clearly beyond
their reach, but further than that, they permitted a
mingling of two matters, on one of which they have
had jurisdiction but on one of which they dearly did
not to such a degree and extent as to render the entire
proceedings below illegal, void, and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. For one of the leading cases on
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this point, see State V'. J(irkpatrick, 181 Wash. 313, 43
P. (2d) 44, in which the defendant was charged identically as the defendant in the district court, Demmick, was
charged. Kirkpatrick was convicted and sentenced to
life imprisonment, but the higher court reversed the
judgment and granted the man a new trial, stating that
it refused to be bound by an archaic common-law practice, ''which impinges upon the fair and impartial trial
guaranteed by the Constitution to everyone charged with
a criminal offense.''
For further light upon .the proper construction of
a statute such as ours, see the case of Beland v. U. 8., 128
F. (2d) 795 (1942). This case supports the View that
the fa·ct of previous convictions does not become material
until after the trial on the substantive offense, and then
it becomes material only for the purpose of determining
a proper term of imprisonment.
PoiNT
TH~T

V.

THE COM.MlT'MENT OF CARL ROLLAND DEMMICK, MADE

AND ENTERED JANUAR.Y 4, 1943, WAS I·LLIDGAL AND
BEYOND THE JURI.SDI>GTION OF THE COURT.

In the case of Carl Rolland Demmick, the court
sentenced the defendant on November 28, 1942, as appears by the commitment.

The court

th~n

ordered the

defendant granted a stay of execution of sentence to
January 4, 1943,

upo~

certain conditions imposed upon

the defendant by the court.

These conditions do not
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appear on the c01nmitment.
the commitn1ent states:

Then on January 4, 1948,

'• The within ncuned defendant having previously
been granted a stay of execution of sentenc-e to
this date, upon recommendation of the State
Adult Parole and Probation D1epartment and good
cause appearing therefore the Court orders the
defendant committed pursuant to the ,iudgment
and sentence previously entered herein.''
The transcript of the proceeding·s of November 28,
1942, which are set out in full in this brief, aid us in
determining what the conditions were upon which he
was granted the parole, suspended sentence, or "stay
of execution'', as it is termed by the court. The court
questioned the defendant as to his work and a~ to his
drinking; in fact, the court said :
"THE CouRT: I believe in each of your offenses there has been the matter of drink connected with it, some drink, some evidence of drink.
One of the conditions of your staying out of the
penitentiary is that you drink no liquor or beer.
That may be hard, but it will be no harder than
if you were in jail where you couldn't get it.
''MR. DEMMICK:

No sir.

''THE CouRT : So you must not drink. If
I hear of your drinking at all, I will sign a commitment, and you will sign the agreement with
Mr. McFadden to report and be under his direction.''
The court further went on to state that he believed that
the defendant could clear the case up, and for that reason he was not putting him in prison. The court even
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went so far as to say that if the defendant could clear
up the case to the satisfaction of the district attorney,
he was satisfied that the district attorney would assist
him, the defendant, in obtaining a pardon in the matter
also.
Now, what happened on January 4, 1943, cannot be
determined as no notes were taken by the reporter on
that date, and it can be safely assumed that the reason
they were not taken was that nothing more occurred
than what appears in the comn1itment in the files in the
case; that is, that upon re·commendation of the State
Adult Parole and Probation Departm·ent, and good cause
appearing therefor, the court orders the defendant ·committed pursuant to the judgment and sentence previously
entered herein. De.finitely, the defendant was not given
an order to show cause why the suspension, or parole,
or stay of execution should not terminate. He was
merely taken into court, and for no reason apparent to
the person reading the record, committed to prison.
There was no citation or order to show cause served on
the defendant in order for him to show the court that he
had complied or was complying with the terms of his
suspension. The record is silent as to the reasons why
the court took an a'bout-face in this matter. Surely the
language of the court at the time he sentenced this defendant is such that the def·endant had reason to believe
that he was being given an opportunity to stay out of
prison for all time, if he complied with certain conditions. In no sense could this be classed as a mere stay
of execution, such as is given on certain occasions to
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prisoners so they may clear up their affail;s, or receive
medieal attention before going to prison. Regardless
of the label,-stay, suspension, or parole-the actions of
the court in this case came squarely under Section 10536-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 (Laws of Utah, 1933).
The court had no jurisdiction to comnrit the defendant
Demmick until there had been a hearing on the revocation of the suspended sentence.
This case falls within the rule laid down in State v.
Zolintakis, 70 U. 296; 259 P. 1044, 54 A. L. R. 1463.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs submit that the lower courts acted
without and beyond their jurisdiction, to try or to hear
the habitual criminal statusFirst: Because the habitual criminal act was repealed
by implication;
Second: Because the pre;vious cnmes of which defendants were convicted did not involve sentences
of ''not less than three years'' as required by the
statute; and
Third: On account of the procedure followed by the
lower courts.
Therefore, all verdicts and commitments based upon
such informations are nullities, void, and subject to attack on habeas corpus.
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The plaintiffs feel that merely to resentence these
plaintiffs on their substantive offenses would not be adequate or sufficient relief, since the co-mingling of that
of which the lower courts ·Obviously had jurisdiction, and
that of which they did not, was such as to render the
whole proceedings void.
Plaintiff Demmick's contention that his commitment
on January 4, 1943, was beyond the jurisdiction of the
court is of course purely academic unless the court finds
that up until this point the lower court acted within its
jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs sUibmit that the writs of habeas corpus
should be granted and that they should be discharged.
Respectfully submitted,
DoROTHEA MERRILL DRYER,

Attorney for Plaintiff Grover
Thompson
Amicus Curiae, by app,ointment of the Supreme Court.
RAYS. McCARTY,

Attorney for Plaintiff Carl
Rolland Demmick.
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